Dragon-Elephant Tango? Why Modi is headed to China

Just a year ago, it would perhaps have taken a big leap of faith for PM Narendra Modi to travel to China. The two countries’ relationship was still on ventilator. The border was relatively quiet, but disengagement of troops at the remaining friction points in eastern Ladakh was still incomplete.

Now, as Modi gets ready to visit Tianjin later this month, it seems the most unambivalent thing to do, grounded in a realistic understanding of global uncertainties and the need to reinforce its multialignment.

It helps, of course, that the agreement Modi reached with President Xi Jinping on the margins of the Brics summit in Oct — that disputes and differences would not be allowed to disturb border peace — has remained unimpaired. While India’s official announcement is awaited, Modi’s visit is all but certain; so is Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s to India next week for talks with NSA Ajit Doval and external affairs minister S Jaishankar .

Multilateral, But Still…

Granted, Modi’s visit is for a multilateral event: the summit meeting of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), a 10-member security-oriented Eurasian grouping dominated by China and Russia, seen as a potential counterweight to Nato. Modi’s last visit to China, in 2018, was also for the SCO summit.

Given the state of its ties with China and Pakistan, India is a bit of an outlier in the group, as it doesn’t join others in endorsing initiatives like the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). In 2023, it also backed out of an economic roadmap as it seemed more aligned with Chinese interests. More recently, India also refused to sign on to a joint statement condemning Israel’s attack on Iran.

However, India acknowledges SCO’s role in combating terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan, promoting connectivity that doesn’t undermine sovereignty and territorial integrity, and facilitating its own ties with Central Asia. Modi has used the SCO Heads of State Council meeting, the highest decision-making body of the organisation, to draw attention to cross-border terrorism, without naming Pakistan.

SCO has also had an important role to play in bringing India and China together. Russia may not have actively mediated between India and China, but it has nudged both sides to use the forum to engage with each other after 2020’s Galwan clash.

The Moscow Consensus, within three months of Galwan — on the margins of the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting in the Russian capital — to ease tensions is a case in point. President Xi Jinping in 2023 also participated in the SCO summit Modi hosted virtually under India’s presidency.

However, Modi has also skipped SCO summit meetings. He missed one in Kazakhstan last year. If Modi is travelling to China, it’s because he understands the salience Xi has attached to the Tianjin summit under China’s presidency, prioritising it over Brics this year, and the need to normalise a relationship that he believes is important not just for India and China, but the entire world. Support from China will also be crucial for India’s Brics presidency next year.

Peaks & Troughs

Trump’s foreign policy has wrongfooted India but, to be fair to the Indian govt, India and China started to rebuild ties long before the US president sent the world careening towards an apocalyptic trade war. In fact, the agreement to end the military standoff in eastern Ladakh happened even before the US presidential elections.

By visiting China, Modi is signalling that India is ready to have a sound working relationship with Beijing — as long as border peace and tranquillity is not disturbed. When NSA Doval visited China last Dec, both sides agreed to maintain peace on the ground so that “issues on the border do not hold back the normal development of bilateral relations”.

India has not allowed China’s military cooperation with Pakistan — even after Operation Sindoor — to ruin the Sino-Indian thaw, and Beijing was muted in its criticism of India’s first joint patrolling of the South China Sea with the Philippines, suggesting a readiness from both sides to take a long view of the relationship. Modi’s bilateral meeting with Xi, which might see important announcements (such as the resumption of direct flights), is an opportunity for both sides to rebuild trust for a mutually beneficial partnership in areas like trade, investment and emerging technologies, in which China is a global leader.

India will expect China to reciprocate by addressing some of its trade restrictions related to manpower and equipment that impact Indian manufacturing, and deliver on the promise to import more to reduce the $100 billion trade deficit. India will also be mindful of China’s efforts to undercut its influence in the neighbourhood and the larger Indo-Pacific. China will expect, as ambassador Xu Feihong told TOI recently, a transparent and non-discriminatory business environment for its companies.

The dragon-elephant tango may have just started but, in these circumstances, it will remain accident-prone. The way the relationship has peaked and troughed from the initial Modi years to the Doklam crisis, and again from the excitement over the informal summits to the Galwan despair, serves as an important lesson. The answer probably lies in Modi’s recent remark, quickly endorsed by Beijing, that competition should not be allowed to turn into conflict.

So, Is It Bye-Bye America?

Not really. Modi has, in the past, attended several SCO summits where he has met Xi — and all it has signified is India’s strategic autonomy. His upcoming visit to China is drawing more attention because of the state of India’s ties with the US.

India and the US seemed set to embark on a new phase in the relationship, based on robust and next-generation defence and technology collaborations, along with stronger energy ties, when Trump dropped his tariff bomb, doubling the levy on India for its oil imports from Russia.

But it will probably take more than one individual, even if he’s the US president, to do any structural damage to a relationship successive American presidents have called one of the most defining partnerships of the 21st century.

Amid calls for India to take on the Trump administration, the govt itself has chosen to avoid confrontation. Trump is known to take maximalist positions ahead of trade agreements, and India is still willing to negotiate. India’s statement that the relationship has weathered such challenges in the past has been received well by the US State Department. The visit to China registers India’s position against Western unilateralism, but India is not giving up on America yet. A possible return of peace in Ukraine can also wipe out half of India’s tariff woes.

Three Things To Note For India
There are three things India will guard against, though. The first is whether Trump, chasing a watershed trade deal with China, will remain as committed to the Indo-Pacific as he was during his previous term, when he revived Quad. The tariff issue has cast a shadow on the upcoming Quad summit India has to host in early Nov. If Trump doesn’t come, there will be questions raised about the US’s long-standing policy of dealing with India as a country that can ensure a sustainable balance of power in the region. India’s efforts to restore ties with China help it hedge against this eventuality.

Second is the strong counterterrorism cooperation that will likely be diluted by Trump’s remarkable turnaround on Pakistan — from accusing it of hoodwinking US presidents on the issue of terrorism to treating it as a lodestar in the fight against the menace. Re-hyphenating India with Pakistan can potentially cause irreparable damage to relations with India.

Third is the impending H-1B overhaul, and the likely impact on Indian professionals in the IT and healthcare sectors. This is sure to ignite another diplomatic firestorm, damaging people-to-people contacts and what India sees as a mutually beneficial economic and technology partnership.

All three are issues that will test India’s resolve and push the limits of Indian diplomacy.